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 CASE AND COMMENT 13
 NEITHER CONTRACT NOR TORT:  SALOMON  TRIUMPHANT? 
 Palmer Birch v Lloyd 
 Gruber v AIG Management France 
 Bumi Armada Offshore Holdings v Tozzi 
 The circumstances in which a company director may be tortiously liable for inducing the 
company’s breach of contract have troubled many thinkers. Comparatively less attention 
has been devoted to the position of a parent or holding company that has allegedly 
induced its subsidiary company to break a contract. In  Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian 
Shipping Co ,  1  the Court of Appeal did not disagree with counsel’s concession that a parent 
would not be liable if it had merely decided, without more, that its own interests did not 
recommend the commitment of its resources to the subsidiary company’s contracts, or 
if it had taken a formal decision as shareholder that the subsidiary company should not 
perform its contracts.  2  This ascendancy of company law offering protection in favour of a 
parent was unaffected by the streamlining of the economic torts in  OBG Ltd v Allan ,  3  for 
Males J (as he then was) stated in  Moran Yacht & Ship Inc v Pisarev  4  that the principle 
of limited liability ought to preclude fi nding a benefi cial owner of a company liable for 
inducing the latter’s breach of contract even where the owner had known of the specifi c 
contractual obligations in question to be performed by the company, which would have 
acted according to the owner’s instructions.  5  
 Fuller exposition of the principles in three recent cases has disclosed questions of 
practical and academic interest. Does the inducement tort permit of what is effectively 
a broad exemption where company shareholders are concerned? If so, what are the 
circumstances in which a controlling shareholder could exceptionally be liable for 
inducing the company’s breaches? It will be convenient to refer to these respectively as 
the fi rst and second questions, the answers to which may not be as easy as believed in some 
of the authorities. 
 The thoughtful decision of Andrew Baker J in  Gruber v AIG Management France SA  6  
introduces some of the competing analyses. After referring to Males J’s  dictum in  Moran , 
his Lordship opined that, if the law governing the piercing of corporate veils did not say 
that the parent had assumed responsibility for the breach, then the imposition of liability 
on the parent by tort law required careful justifi cation, which surely meant something 
more than that the subsidiary company’s breach was the parent’s intended and procured 
outcome.  7  Regarding the fi rst question, therefore, the primacy given to company law 
principles resulted essentially in the alteration of some of the usual rules governing tortious 
inducement where controlling shareholders were implicated. 
 1 .  [2002] EWCA Civ 889;  [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 436 . 
 2 .  Ibid , [132]. 
 3 .  [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] AC 1. 
 4 .  [2014] EWHC 1098 (Comm);  [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 88 . 
 5 .  Ibid , [115]. 
 6 .  [2018] EWHC 3030 (Comm). 
 7 .  Ibid , [141]. 
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14 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
 In relation to the second question, his Lordship raised two alternative approaches to 
affi xing liability upon a parent that had done “something more” than intending for and 
procuring the subsidiary company to break its contract. The fi rst was to extend the notion 
of third-party interference into this context, which although not fully explored in the 
judgment seems to entail modifying or supplementing the elements of tortious inducement 
in such fashion as would bring errant shareholders within the ring of tortious liability. The 
second approach (call this the company law analysis) was to pierce the corporate veil in 
accordance with orthodox company law, if the parent had abused the corporate structure 
by making a determination for the subsidiary company resulting in a breach of contract. 
Because his Lordship ultimately viewed any affi xation of liability upon the parent to 
really be grounded in its abuse of the privilege of creating separate corporate identities 
and sheltering behind the corporate veil when contractual obligees came calling to enforce 
their rights, the company law analysis—which more accurately refl ected the substance of 
the wrongdoing—was tentatively preferred over the extensionary analysis.  8  
 By contrast,  Palmer Birch v Lloyd  9  is more a case on the fi rst question. Sitting in 
the High Court, HHJ Russen QC was invited to consider the authority of  Stocznia 
Gdanska , which he approached with some caution, given the House’s later overhaul of 
the economic torts. He eventually concluded that, consistent with the basic concept of 
limited legal liability as set out in  Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd ,  10  the case remained 
good for the proposition that a parent was not liable under the inducement tort if, 
without being under any obligation to do so, it decided not to put its subsidiary company 
in funds, resulting in the latter’s being unable to render contractual performance.  11  
Signifi cantly, though, Judge Russen appeared more broadly to see no special rule or 
exemption governing controlling shareholders in the tortious inducement context. 
In stating that tort law could not ride roughshod over long-established company law 
principles “unless factors of inducement … [justifi ed] it doing so”  12  —factors such as 
a request or instruction from the parent to its subsidiary company to break a contract, 
or a diversion of funds away from the subsidiary company in an abuse of the privilege 
of separate corporate personality—the implicit suggestion, on one reading, is that the 
 normal rules continue to apply even where it is a controlling shareholder that is alleged 
to be liable for tortious inducement (see also the judgment’s succinct and unembellished 
discussion of the intention requirement  13  ). 
 The third authority is  Bumi Armada Offshore Holdings Ltd v Tozzi Srl .  14  Lord Neuberger 
of Abbotsbury, delivering the sole judgment in the Singapore Court of Appeal, said:  15  
 “As a matter of principle, the mere fact that the parent could have prevented the subsidiary from 
breaching its contract, ie, mere inaction, would plainly not be enough to render the parent liable for 
 8 .  Ibid , [142]. 
 9 .  [2018] EWHC 2316 (TCC); [2018] 4 WLR 164. 
 10 .  [2013] UKSC 34; [2013] 2 AC 415. 
 11 .  Palmer Birch [2018] EWHC 2316 (TCC); [2018] 4 WLR 164, [169], [173] and [350]. 
 12 .  Ibid , [169], [360], [361] and [363]. 
 13 .  Ibid , [174]. 
 14 .  [2018] SGCA(I) 5; [2019] 1 SLR 10; noted P Koh, “Holding Company’s Liability for Inducing Its 
Subsidiary’s Contractual Breach” (2020) 136 LQR 30. 
 15 .  Ibid , [43] and [47]. 
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 CASE AND COMMENT 15
the tort of inducing a breach of contract. Quite apart from that, if the law was otherwise, it would 
impermissibly undermine the fundamental principle of independent corporate identity laid down in 
[ Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd  16  ] … the mere fact that a shareholder with a controlling interest 
acts in such a way as to induce a company to breach its contract as a matter of fact, is not enough to 
render the shareholder liable for inducing the breach of contract as a matter of law: something more 
is required.” 
 This passage seems to suggest according controlling shareholders a distinct position 
within the tortious inducement framework. As his Lordship put it, whether the circumstances 
were such that a parent could properly be held liable for inducing its subsidiary company’s 
breach of contract constituted a  further issue to be examined  in addition to the staple 
procurement, knowledge and intention elements.  17  
 So far this rather echoes  Gruber on the fi rst question, but on the second question—the 
circumstances in which shareholders were exceptionally liable under the inducement 
tort—it is the extensionary analysis that Lord Neuberger espouses instead. In an apparent 
modifi cation of the elements of the tort, he stated that a shareholder in a company was 
not liable for inducing the company’s breach of contract if the actions said to give rise 
to liability merely involved the shareholder pursuing in good faith its own interest in its 
capacity as a shareholder in the company; even a controlling shareholder’s summoning 
of a general meeting or suasion of the company’s directors to breach a contract would 
 not make it liable for tortious inducement, if it believed that the company was ultimately 
better off breaching the contract (resulting in the company’s shares being worth 
more).  18  On the basis of the present case, his Lordship viewed any fi nding of liability 
as requiring the controlling shareholder to have acted in a way other than in good faith 
when pursuing its own interest as an owner of shares in the company, or to have pursued 
an interest unrelated to (or possibly in addition to) its capacity as shareholder.  19  This 
portion of the judgment is cautious not to tender an exhaustive list of circumstances 
in which liability might attach to a controlling shareholder, so these could differ yet 
further from the grounds for piercing the corporate veil under the company law analysis 
preferred by Andrew Baker J. It can be debated also whether Lord Neuberger’s open-
textured approach provides commercial parties the relative certainty they might seek in 
this area of the law. 
 In summary, on the question whether the usual constituent elements of tortious 
inducement apply without supplement or modifi cation to controlling shareholders,  Palmer 
Birch seems to suggest a positive answer, while  Bumi and  Gruber impose additional 
requirements to be satisfi ed before any such shareholder may be found liable. On the 
second question it follows, not unexpectedly, that  Palmer Birch does not spell out any 
particular circumstance in which a controlling shareholder will exceptionally be liable 
for tortious inducement; the other two cases do, but impose different requirements that 
claimants must further satisfy.  Bumi asks at least for a showing that the shareholder acted 
 16 .  [1897] AC 22. 
 17 .  [2018] SGCA(I) 5; [2019] 1 SLR 10, [41]. 
 18 .  Ibid , [45]. 
 19 .  Ibid , [47–48]. 
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16 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
without good faith or to further a collateral interest, whereas  Gruber would utilise the 
orthodox grounds for piercing the corporate veil. 
 It should be mentioned that at least three other reported cases in England and Wales 
broach this issue, although their resolution is inconclusive. In  Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v 
Kingswood Motors (Addlestone) Ltd ,  20   Law Debenture Trust Corp v Ural Caspian Oil 
Corp Ltd  21  and  Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd ,  22  it was either assumed or undisputed 
that a controlling shareholder had committed tortious inducement simply by intending 
and procuring the company to break its contract; without reading overly into omissions 
for which detailed submissions may not have been received, no judge came close to 
saying that the rules governing the tort were to be applied more restrictedly to controlling 
shareholders. In  Law Debenture Trust Corp there was a remark by Sir Thomas Bingham 
MR (as he then was) regarding the piercing of corporate veils, but that was directed only 
at unmade (speculative) causes of action rather than the inducement tort itself.  23  A fourth 
case,  Marex Financial Ltd v Sevilleja ,  24  may have certain implications, although it is not 
directly on point. The Court of Appeal there held that the rule against refl ective loss barred 
a judgment creditor from suing the judgment debtor’s ultimate benefi cial owner—who 
had allegedly divested the debtor’s assets to frustrate enforcement of the judgment—in 
the tort of inducing or procuring the debtor to act in violation of the creditor’s rights 
under the judgment. The decision has attracted trenchant criticism;  25  with the Supreme 
Court expected to rule on the appeal soon, it suffi ces to say here that the Court of 
Appeal’s ruling, if ever extended to apply in the context of a breach of contract, would 
have the unprecedented effect of generally precluding any and all persons who contract 
with a company from claiming for tortious inducement of breach of contract against the 
controlling shareholders of the company. 
 Thus, for the moment the fi eld appears relatively open, and the English senior courts 
have the opportunity to set the law right at the fi rst try. They will also have the benefi t of 
Lord Neuberger’s opinion in  Bumi . Upon closer consideration of his views, it is suggested, 
with respect, that they ought not to be adopted unqualifi edly in England and Wales. 
 Consider these alternative scenarios. In the fi rst, supplier X persuades Company A to 
break its existing contract with Y, with the aim of Company A executing a fresh agreement 
with X. In the second, the controlling shareholder of Company A persuades it to break 
that very same contract with Y, which contract is causing Company A to incur losses and 
denting the value of its shares, and instead to execute a fresh agreement with X. 
 Taking Lord Neuberger’s approach in  Bumi , it would be acceptable to fi nd X liable 
for inducing a breach of contract in the fi rst scenario, but not the shareholder in the 
second. This anomalous result is down to the special status of that shareholder  vis-à-
vis Company A; invoking  Salomon  v A Salomon and Co Ltd ,  26  his Lordship said that a 
 20 .  [1974] QB 142. 
 21 .  [1995] Ch 152. 
 22 .  [2007] EWCA Civ 1303; [2008] Ch 244. 
 23 .  Law Debenture Trust Corp [1995] Ch 152, 164E–H. 
 24 .  [2018] EWCA Civ 1468; [2019] QB 173. 
 25 .  S Gee, “Asset Stripping Refl ective Loss and Injunctions” [2019] JBL 89; A Tettenborn, “Creditors and 
Refl ective Loss—A Bar Too Far?” (2019) 135 LQR 182. 
 26 .  [1897] AC 22. 
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 CASE AND COMMENT 17
shareholder pursuing in good faith its own interest  qua shareholder could not be held 
liable, as otherwise it would “effectively have to choose between sacrifi cing [its] right 
of pursuing [its] self-interest  bona fi de as a shareholder or fi nding [itself] liable for 
the company’s breach of contract”.  27  It is hard to understand this reasoning. The “self-
interest” of a shareholder has hitherto not encompassed the arrogation of any legitimate 
entitlement to frustrate or interfere with the performance of binding agreements, whether 
entered into by the company or other persons. The law allows shareholders to extract a 
solvent company’s assets (such as through dividend distributions or capital reductions) 
but providing inducements to break a contract hardly seems an appropriate method for 
doing so. No amount of good faith assists, for the question does not even arise. If the 
principle of separate legal personality is relevant, it is that the creation and observance 
of the company’s contractual obligations are matters primarily for the company and its 
directors, free from the undue interference of anyone else (including its shareholders) 
unless otherwise required by its constitution or by statute.  28  Lord Neuberger’s approach, 
it may be thought, gives too little moment to these considerations and the position of 
those who deal with companies. It also tends to ignore the unhappy asymmetry it creates 
when one compares this with the case where a controller has made misrepresentations 
about its subsidiary company to induce a third party to  enter into a contract with the 
company, something which Lord Neuberger had indicated in a previous decision  would 
ordinarily give rise to a direct cause of action (in misrepresentation) by the third party 
against the controller.  29  
 Why, it may be asked, should a person’s right to thwart third parties from inducing a 
breach of its contract—a right generally available against the world—be defeated merely 
because the inducer happens to be a shareholder of its counterparty? Why would one 
willingly deal with a company if its shareholders could muscle in and encourage breaches 
of contract with unpunished alacrity?  30  To allow commercial expectations to fl uctuate so 
readily depending on the incorporation status of the breaching party and the identity of the 
inducer is not consistent with either the broad sentiment throughout English contract law 
that agreements freely entered into should be performed and not broken, or the commercial 
spirit of the principles established in favour of persons dealing with companies, of which 
the best known is probably the rule in  Royal British Bank v Turquand ,  31  now functionally 
replaced by the Companies Act 2006, s.40. It would be a matter of regret if the corporate 
vehicle, designed principally as an engine of enterprise, were to become a source of 
hesitance by commercial parties in their transactions. 
 In  Bumi , Lord Neuberger also supported the more generous rule favouring controlling 
shareholders by citing the “practical diffi culties” that could ensue should a shareholder be 
 27 .  Bumi [2018] SGCA(I) 5; [2019] 1 SLR 10, [45]. 
 28 .  See also A Muscat,  The Liability of the Holding Company for the Debts of its Insolvent Subsidiaries 
(Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1996), 129 (“It is the exercise of the latent power of control to the extent of a direct 
interference in the internal decision-making function of the subsidiary which will make the holding company 
the actor in the tort”). 
 29 .  VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek International Corp [2013] UKSC 5;  [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 466 , [139]. 
 30 .  Cf R Bagshaw, “Inducing Breach of Contract”, in J Horder (ed.),  Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Fourth 
Series (OUP, Oxford, 2000) 132. 
 31 .  (1856) 6 E & B 327. 
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18 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
made to choose between sacrifi cing its interests  qua shareholder and taking on liability for 
the company’s breach of contract.  32  The nature of these diffi culties was not elaborated upon, 
but just before this passage his Lordship wrote permissively of a controlling shareholder 
which would go about persuading the company’s directors to breach a contract binding 
upon the company, if that were done to give effect to its view that the company was 
better off breaching the contract (with the consequence that the company’s shares were 
worth more). This vignette is rendered less startling once the reader appreciates that his 
Lordship appears to be approving of the theory of effi cient breach. Leaving aside the 
uncertain extent of its reception in this area of English law,  33  it may be questioned why the 
theory—and its promotion of overall economic effi ciency—would not as formulated be 
potentially applicable to  all acts of inducement and, at a snap, eliminate tortious liability 
therefor. There is, quite simply, no reason to stop at company shareholders. This part of the 
judgment yields little hint on whether Lord Neuberger intended to challenge an existential 
underpinning of the inducement tort or only to grant partial immunity to a limited class 
(ie, controlling shareholders). On either selection, it is doubtful that a shareholder has any 
relevantly unique characteristics that set it apart. 
 A parent having shareholding control over a subsidiary company cannot, without 
more, be liable for inducement, and nothing should cast doubt on that. But if a parent 
and its subsidiary can be joint tortfeasors,  34  then a parent is capable of undertaking such 
action as might constitute a tortious inducement of the subsidiary’s breach of contract. 
One illustration takes the apparent conundrum where the company’s breach is requested 
and authorised by unanimous agreement or resolution of its shareholders;  35  the solution 
becomes clearer once the internal dimension is distinguished from the external.  36  
Shareholder approval, however resounding or absolute, is a means of conferring internal 
authority for the company to act in the manner desired. To the outside world the resultant 
act (the breach of contract) is, and always will be, the  company’s act. It may sometimes 
be convenient to say that the act of the shareholders is the act of the company, but to 
suggest that the shareholders’ liability for interfering with the contract dissipates for that 
reason is a  non sequitur , one that passed unidentifi ed at fi rst instance in  Stocznia Gdanska 
SA v Latvian Shipping Co .  37  The shareholders have never merged in any way with the 
company; their respective assets and liabilities remain separate and free from unlawful 
appropriation; they continue, in other words, to be entities apart. In such circumstances it 
would in my view be unprincipled to treat the shareholders as having dropped out of the 
picture for the purposes of tort law. 
 Generally, therefore, no special place should be reserved for controlling shareholders 
where liability for tortious inducement is otherwise to be found.  Palmer Birch , it is 
 32 .  Bumi [2018] SGCA(I) 5; [2019] 1 SLR 10, [45]. 
 33 .  See further PS Davies,  Accessory Liability (Hart, Oxford, 2015), 168–170. 
 34 .  Sandman v Panasonic UK Ltd [1998] FSR 651. 
 35 .  J O’Sullivan, “Intentional Economic Torts, Commercial Transactions and Professional Liability” (2008) 
24 J of Professional Negligence 164, 178. 
 36 .  See further the discussion in R Grantham, “The Unanimous Consent Rule in Company Law” (1993) 52 
CLJ 245, 266–271. 
 37 .  [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 537 , [239–244]. For a contrary view, see M Christie, “Breaches of Contract by 
Corporations—Potential Liabilities of Directors and Controllers for Inducing Breach” (2013) 28 Aust J Corp 
Law 304, 320–321; Koh (2020) 136 LQR 30, 33–34. 
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 2
1/
05
/2
02
0 
16
:3
8
© Informa UK plc. No unauthorised copying or sharing of this document is permitted
 CASE AND COMMENT 19
respectfully suggested, got it correct. Those who contract with a company do not reasonably 
assume the risk that the company’s parent might direct it to break that contract without 
repercussions. It often also ignores reality, as many commercial lawyers know, to say that 
the contractor could always have obtained a guarantee from the parent. All this is far from 
saying that a shareholder’s interests are to be disregarded; it is only that the constituent 
elements of the tort should be analysed in the usual way. Some will nevertheless want 
to characterise this as a limitation on the exercise or protection of those interests, but 
even that in truth has not been viewed as an absolute entitlement, as witnessed by the 
law’s having necessarily to mitigate the unfair consequences which occasionally result.  38  
It follows, in my opinion, that the extensionary analysis in  Bumi needs reconsideration 
so far as it would impose additional requirements a claimant must satisfy before tortious 
inducement can be made out. 
 We should still refl ect carefully on Andrew Baker J’s concern for tort law not to 
intervene unduly if the law governing the piercing of corporate veils did not say that the 
parent had assumed responsibility for the breach,  39  matched by Lord Neuberger’s warning 
that tort law is not to be invoked to blur the principle that a company was a separate legal 
personality.  40  To address these properly, two points should be untangled. Liability in tort 
and under company law may obviously arise in different circumstances and further different 
purposes. The inducement tort constitutes liability of a secondary nature, predicated on an 
actual breach of contract, and is intended to protect the claimant’s interest in seeing the 
counterparty perform its bargain. The limited situations in which the corporate veil is 
pierced commonly feature misuse of the corporate structure, which may or may not involve 
incitation or assistance of a contract breach. A case might therefore involve liability only 
in tort, or only under company law, or both in tort and under company law; whichever 
obtains is determined by the freestanding rules of each claim. It cannot appear right that 
the mere interposition of a corporate form  prima facie immunises, by default, an entire 
subset of potential tortfeasors, given that the causes of action actually target different types 
of conduct.  41  This is an instance where, in relation to shareholders, company law rules 
should  not necessarily have primacy over tort rules.  42  Concurrent liability ought not to be 
outwith the realm of possibility even in the case of a sole shareholder of a company who is 
also its sole director; on this particular application English law should complete its escape 
from, or at base re-evaluate, the diffi cult reasoning in  Said v Butt .  43  
 38 .  Such as through the creation of a rule that a company in insolvency has to take into account the interests 
of its creditors (and not just those of its shareholders) when acting. 
 39 .  Gruber [2018] EWHC 3030 (Comm), [141]. 
 40 .  Bumi [2018] SGCA(I) 5; [2019] 1 SLR 10, [42]. 
 41 .  See also  LMI Australasia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Hornibrook Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 74, [98]. 
 42 .  See further R Flannigan, “The Personal Tort Liability of Directors” (2002) 81 Can Bar Rev 247, 261; 
 contra R Grantham and C Rickett, “Directors’ Tortious Liability: Contract, Tort or Company Law?” (1999) 
62 MLR 133, 139; N Campbell and J Armour, “Demystifying the Civil Liability of Corporate Agents” (2003) 
62 CLJ 290, 296; More recently, Lord Briggs seemingly accepted that a parent was to be considered as 
separate from its subsidiary when analysing whether it owed a tortious duty of care to a third party in respect of 
that subsidiary’s activities (Lungowe v Vedanta Resources Plc [2019] UKSC 20; [2019] 2 WLR 1051; [2019] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 399, [54]; noted W Day, “Piggyback Jurisdiction and the Corporate Veil” (2019) 135 LQR 551; A 
Sanger, “Parent Company Duty of Care to Third Parties Harmed by Overseas Subsidiaries” (2019) 78 CLJ 486). 
 43 .  [1920] 3 KB 497.  Cf  Antuzis v DJ Houghton Catching Services Ltd [2019] EWHC 843 (QB); [2019] Bus 
LR 1532, [112–130]; R Stevens, “Why Do Agents ‘Drop Out’?”  [2005] LMCLQ 101 , 107–108. 
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20 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
 The second point is that a shareholder’s right or interest  qua shareholder could still 
possibly be accounted for without upsetting the overall schema of tortious inducement. On 
present understanding, if an inducer can point to its superior right it may raise a defence of 
justifi cation. Such a superior right could be a right in personal property. There might even 
be a role for a private interest in forming the exculpatory element.  44   Pace Edmundson,  45  
is it then open for a controlling shareholder’s right or interest  qua owner of shares in a 
company to fall within this defi nition, so that its actions in inducing the company’s breach 
of contract may at least be weighed against or in the light of that right or interest? Even so 
there might have to be some reconsideration of the defence; for example, do shareholders 
ever have an interest in profi ting from their shareholdings  46  or any “enforceable fi nancial 
interest in the affairs of the person who is persuaded to break the contract”  47  ? Cane once 
stated that a justifi cation defence would probably fail if the inducer’s only interest was 
the furtherance of its own commercial well-being.  48  Whether that is indeed the case, or 
whether the tort will be re-imagined for shareholders, awaits further clarifi cation. 
 Lau Kwan Ho* 
 EXTRATERRITORIALITY: ENFORCEMENT 
JURISDICTION ABROAD 
 R (on the application of Jimenez) v First Tier Tribunal 
 It is trite that, under international law, a government will not seek to confer powers 
upon its organs of state which would result in those institutions exercising enforcement 
jurisdiction over either property or persons present within the territories of another state.  1  
 44 .  H Carty,  An Analysis of the Economic Torts , 2nd edn (OUP, Oxford, 2010), 67–68. Some have further 
argued for the widening of the justifi cation defence; see, eg, D Howarth, “Against  Lumley v Gye ” (2005) 68 
MLR 195. 
 45 .  P Edmundson, “Sidestepping Limited Liability in Corporate Groups Using the Tort of Interference with 
Contract” (2006) 30 Melb ULR 62, 83. 
 46 .  Cf  Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204, 224. 
 47 .  JD Heydon, “The Defence of Justifi cation in Cases of Intentionally Caused Economic Loss” (1970) 20 
UTLJ 139, 164.  Cf the US position in, eg,  Felsen v Sol Cafe Mfg Corp 24 NY 2d 682, 686–687 (1969);  Boulevard 
Associates v Sovereign Hotels Inc 72 F.3d 1029, 1036–1037 (1995);  White Plains Coat & Apron Co Inc v Cintas 
Corp 8 NY 3d 422, 426–427 (2007). See also M Izzo, “The Limits of  Lumley v Gye : Commercial Disputes and 
the Tort of Interference with Contractual Relations” (2005) 13 Torts LJ 188, 196; Koh (2020) 136 LQR 30, 34. 
 48.  P Cane,  Tort Law and Economic Interests , 2nd edn (Clarendon, Oxford, 1996), 121.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. 
 1.  See  Government of India v Taylor [1955] AC 491, 503,  per Viscount Simonds: “I was greatly surprised to 
hear it suggested that the courts of this country would and should entertain a suit by a foreign State to recover a 
tax. For at any time since I have had any acquaintance with the law I should have said, as Rowlatt J said in  King 
of the Hellenes v Brostron (1923) 16 Ll L Rep 190, 193: ‘It is perfectly elementary that a foreign government 
cannot come here—nor will the courts of other countries allow our Government to go there—and sue a person 
found in that jurisdiction for taxes levied and which he is declared to be liable to in the country to which he 
belongs.’ That was in 1923. In 1928 Tomlin J in  In re Visser, Queen of Holland v Drukker [1928] Ch 877, 884 … 
added: ‘… there is a well-recognised rule, which has been enforced for at least 200 years or thereabouts, under 
which these courts will not collect the taxes of foreign States for the benefi t of the sovereigns of those foreign 
States; and this is one of those actions which these courts will not entertain’.” Viscount Simonds went on (at 
